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395 
STILL TOO CLOSE TO CALL?  RETHINKING STAMPP’S 
“THE CONCEPT OF A PERPETUAL UNION” 
Daniel W. Hamilton∗ 
In a classic article in the Journal of American History, which was 
based on his presidential address to the Organization of American 
Historians in 1978, the great Civil War historian Kenneth Stampp made 
the claim that the arguments in favor of the constitutionality of secession 
made by the Southern states were as strong, if not stronger than the 
constitutional arguments made, then and now, in opposition to 
secession.1  Stampp is to my mind the greatest Civil War historian of the 
20th century and his views on secession remain required reading and are 
cited routinely today.     
This is not to say Stampp was correct, only to use his classic article 
on the 150th anniversary of secession as a jumping off point for 
reconsidering the legality and constitutionality of secession and also, I 
think, to go to first principles to consider whether it is possible or useful 
to definitively try and answer the question:  was secession legal?   
This is a thought piece, a historiographical meditation, or more 
accurately something of a polemic, with very little of archival heavy 
lifting, but still asking questions that bedevil Civil War historians about 
the perhaps irresistible presentism in the field of Civil War legal 
history.2     
Stampp presented secession as “the fundamental issue of the [Civil 
W]ar” and framed secession as a constitutional crisis that turned on 
questions surrounding “the locus of sovereignty in the political structure 
that the Constitution of 1787 had formed.”3  In particular, Stampp asked:  
did the Constitution “create a union of sovereign states, each of which 
retained the right to secede at its own discretion?  Or did it create a 
 
∗ Professor of Law and History, University of Illinois College of Law.  Co-Director of the Illinois 
Legal History Program.  
 1. Kenneth M. Stampp, The Concept of a Perpetual Union, J. AM. HIST., June 1978, at 5. 
 2. Some of the following argument is based on claims I made in Getting Right Without 
Lincoln, 45 TULSA L. REV. (SYMPOSIUM ISSUE) 715 (2010). 
 3. Stampp, supra note 1, at 5. 
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union from which no state, once having joined, could escape except by 
an extra-constitutional act of revolution?”4  The Constitution, Stampp 
concluded, was “silen[t] on this crucial question.”5  Indeed, he argues 
that “the unionist case was sufficiently flawed to make it uncertain 
whether in 1865 reason and logic were on the side of the victors.”6  This 
is not to say the union was wrong, and Stampp is quick to add that “in 
the tangled web of claim[] and counterclaim[]” it was unclear whether 
reason and logic were “indisputably on either side.”7 
In this way, Stampp lays the groundwork for the argument that the 
Confederate constitutional argument for secession was as reasonable and 
logical as the Union’s, and in particular, Lincoln’s constitutional 
argument for a perpetual union.  This was novel then and now—even 
heretical, in so far as it challenges Lincoln’s arguments in the First 
Inaugural and elsewhere that secession was manifestly unconstitutional 
and illegal, a position later adopted by the Supreme Court in 1869 in 
Texas v. White.8   
To do this, Stampp deploys a kind of historically nuanced 
originalism, not in the service of answering a modern constitutional 
question, but in the service of demonstrating an essential ambiguity in 
Philadelphia in 1787 on the question of whether the Constitution created 
a perpetual union, concluding “[i]n truth, the wording of the Constitution 
gives neither the believers in the right of secession nor the advocates of a 
perpetual union a case so decisive that all reasonable persons are bound 
to accept it.”9  
Turning from the text to the debates in Philadelphia, Stampp found 
similar “baffling inconsistencies and obscurities.”10  Moreover, the 
ratification debates did not provide greater clarity so that “in 1789, when 
the present Union came into existence, the question of whether a 
member state could secede at will remained unresolved.”11  The question 
of the legality of secession was of course continually debated in the 
antebellum era, in the debates over the Kentucky and Virginia 
Resolutions, over the admission of slave and free states to the Union, 
and most dramatically in the Nullification Crisis in the 1830s.  It was 
then that for Stampp an American president offered, in Andrew 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 6. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1869). 
 9. Stampp, supra note 1, at 12. 
 10. Id. at 13. 
 11. Id. at 19. 
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Jackson’s Proclamation on Nullification in 183212 that “the concept of a 
perpetual union had achieved its full development, and a President of the 
United States had pledged himself to use all the power of the federal 
government to uphold it.”13  Lincoln and the Supreme Court relied upon 
Jackson’s proclamation in making their arguments for a perpetual union 
decades later.     
Even then, though, Stampp argues that by the time of the 
Nullification Crisis, “the case for state sovereignty and the constitutional 
right of secession had flourished for forty years before a comparable 
case for perpetual union had been devised.”14  Thus, “because that case 
came so late, because the logic behind it was far from perfect, because 
the Constitution and the debates over ratification were fraught with 
ambiguity,” it remained the case that the question could ultimately only 
be settled by war.15  And there Stampp ends the article.   
This is to my mind a radical endpoint, one that embraces historical 
uncertainty on a crucial constitutional question, perhaps the central 
constitutional question of the Civil War.  Stampp poses the question:  
“was secession unconstitutional?”  And answers with, to my mind, a 
salutary and even correct answer:  “we don’t know.”  Both sides had 
compelling arguments made over decades and both sides could draw on 
history in making their claims, and each claim was as logical and 
reasonable as the other.     
This is a radical endpoint for two reasons.  First because it refuses 
to answer the question:  “was secession constitutional?”  Stampp refuses 
to answer this question because it is, he shows, essentially unanswerable, 
or at least too close to call, and unresolved as a legal and constitutional 
matter at the time of secession.  If Stampp is correct, this raises the 
question whether we, 150 years later, can stand uncertainty on such a 
fundamental constitutional question of the Civil War.  What if we cannot 
definitively answer the question:  “did Lincoln have the legal authority 
to war to suppress secession?”  Second, Stampp’s argument is radical for 
the simple fact that it suggests that the Confederacy’s legal claim for 
secession was as valid as the Union’s claim for perpetual union.  It is 
here that Stampp, to my mind, may have mischaracterized secession by 
 
 12. Andrew Jackson, Proclamation, in COMMITTEE ON THE LIBRARY, GEN. COURT OF MASS., 
STATE PAPERS ON NULLIFICATION:  INCLUDING THE PUBLIC ACTS OF THE CONVENTION OF THE 
PEOPLE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, ASSEMBLED AT COLUMBIA, NOVEMBER 19, 1932, AND MARCH 11, 
1833, THE PROCLAMATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THE PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE SEVERAL STATE LEGISLATURES WHICH HAVE ACTED ON THE SUBJECT 75 (1834). 
 13. Stampp, supra note 1, at 32. 
 14. Id. at 33. 
 15. Id. 
3
Hamilton: Still Too Close to Call?
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012
8- HAMILTON_MACRO.DOCM 6/13/2012  3:39 PM 
398 AKRON LAW REVIEW [45:395 
making the claim that secession can be considered as a legal question 
standing alone.    
Let me turn to each point in turn.  More than sixty years ago, David 
Donald wrote his landmark essay Getting Right With Lincoln.16  Donald 
wrote mostly about politicians’ use of Abraham Lincoln since his 
assassination, and in particular how Lincoln was transformed from a 
deeply divisive symbol, into, by the end of World War II, “everybody’s 
grandfather” or a “nonpartisan, nonsectional hero.”  It thus became 
increasingly necessary to seek Lincoln’s imagined blessing for a given 
political position or candidate or party, and by the middle of the 20th 
century, “no reputable political organization could omit a reference to 
the Great Emancipator, nor could the disreputable ones.”  What Donald 
brought to light most vividly was the blatantly opportunistic use of 
Lincoln in political discourse.  Yet in the end, Donald is careful not to 
mock or condemn this practice outright, which remains a staple of our 
politics.  The symbolism of Lincoln remains potent and has a history of 
its own.17  Donald is also careful not to try and get right, or get wrong, 
with Lincoln, and if anything, his treatment is admiring but wary—
concluding that “perhaps the secret of Lincoln’s continuing vogue is his 
essential ambiguity.”18 
What Donald brought to light most vividly was the drive to get 
right with Lincoln in American politics.  Yet the drive to get right with 
Lincoln is also at the heart of most of the legal and Constitutional history 
of the Civil War.  The academic manifestation of this drive is twofold.  
First, Lincoln is most often at the center of the story, making the 
Congress and the courts and other legal actors bit players, relevant only 
in so far as they interact with Lincoln.  Second, Lincoln is forced, in 
varying degrees, into the present.  This presentism takes the form of 
different versions of the same basic question:  was Lincoln right, was he 
justified in doing what he did during the Civil War?19  Was he right to 
meet secession with military force?  To suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus?  Or to declare a blockade or to call up the army or to exile 
political prisoners to the Confederacy?  Was he right to issue the 
Emancipation Proclamation?  These questions are central in much of the 
 
 16. David Donald, Getting Right With Lincoln, reprinted in LINCOLN RECONSIDERED:  
ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL WAR ERA (1st ed. 1961).   
 17. Matthew Pinsker, Lincoln Theme 2.0, J. AM. HIST., Sept. 2009, at 417.   
 18. Hamilton, supra note 2, at 715. 
 19. JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (1926).  It remains 
central in leading accounts of Civil War legal history.  See 2 MICHAEL BURLINGAME, ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN:  A LIFE (2008); MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY:  ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND 
CIVIL LIBERTIES (1991). 
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academic writing on Civil War and it is here that the popular and 
academic drive to get right with Lincoln merge.  The popular and 
cultural force of Lincoln remains so strong, he remains such a talisman 
for our time, that even we historians cannot consign him to the past.  Not 
only do we need him to make rulings on our actions in the present—
what would Lincoln think of Guantanamo—but we also need to make 
rulings on his actions as president as part of our ongoing debates on 
presidential power and the Constitution in wartime.20 
This is not to say that legal historians of the Civil War are 
predominantly presentist, or that they are only interested in whether 
Lincoln was right.  This is to say that there is in much Civil War history 
a central presentist preoccupation that does not loom as large in any 
other era, namely, whether particular legal and constitutional actions 
were justified in some absolute sense.  We historians do not generally 
ask whether Lord Grenville was right to issue the Stamp Act, or whether 
Jackson was right to crush the Bank of the United States or whether 
Wilson was right to sign the Treaty of Versailles.  We do not, in other 
words, usually ask whether a historical actor was right or wrong by our 
lights.  Yet we cannot resist asking this about legal actors during the 
Civil War, particularly Lincoln.  I simply do not know if Lincoln was 
right to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and I maintain we cannot 
answer this question historically.  We might be able to explain why he 
suspended the writ, or the effects of its suspension then and afterwards.  
We can also bring to light the competing legal arguments made at the 
time, and explain why some won and others lost.  But we cannot survey 
the sources and come to a definitive ruling on the merits on these central 
legal questions any more than we can come to definitive understanding 
of the original meaning of the due process clause.  We will never know 
if Lincoln was right or justified in his legal actions any more than we 
will know whether Cromwell and his supporters were right to execute 
Charles I.   
This is also not to say that historians need to put on a white coat 
and simply make scientific judgments about the weight of the facts.  Of 
course, our values infuse our writing of history; we only care about 
history in large part because of its meaning in the present.  We always 
and at all times bring our values into our work, yet these values are best 
left at the service of the history we tell.  We may present the Declaration 
of Independence as radical and egalitarian or as conservative and 
hierarchical or somewhere in between.  The sources are open to either 
 
 20. Hamilton, supra note 2, at 715. 
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interpretation.  We do not, however, ask historians of the era to come to 
a definitive conclusion as to whether Jefferson was right to assert the 
Revolution was justified by international and natural law at the time and 
so justifies revolution today.   
The question that comes to mind in considering the legality of 
secession, as Stampp did thirty years ago, is whether we are willing to 
accept Stampp’s answer of indeterminacy.  That is, whether we might 
have a legal history that of the Civil War that does not ultimately attempt 
to answer these kinds of questions.  Can we have a legal history of the 
Civil War that does not evaluate constitutional and legal actions on the 
merits, treating them as resolvable if only we get the law right?  More 
importantly perhaps, do we want one?  If we lose Lincoln as the 
centerpiece, do we lose a galvanizing figure that has given the field 
coherence over decades?  If we resist making rulings on legal actions, 
and not providing answers to questions that people want answered by 
historians, do we risk obscurity and familiar charges of relativism?  If 
there are no definitive answers to the question, then are there other 
essential issues revolving around the Civil War that are equally 
indeterminate?  
It is almost customary that in books on the legal and constitutional 
history of the Civil War there is an explicit move to seek out lessons we 
might draw in the present.  This concern for lessons is a red flag for 
Lincoln and Civil War presentism, and is a part of many rich and 
important histories.  Lincoln’s actions and that of the Congress and the 
courts are parsed and declared either as legally and constitutionally 
sound or unsound.  To be sure, this makes the work more timely and 
immediate and allows historians to take part in a decades-long 
conversation assessing Lincoln’s wartime actions.  Yet to go into the 
Civil War looking to answer our modern questions is, to my mind, to 
distort the inquiry and is in the end too high a price to pay.  Legal 
arguments invite counter-arguments, but this temptation itself reveals the 
mostly fruitless nature of this kind of historical debate.  Legal arguments 
are made back and forth with no winner because there can be no winner 
in a ruling on the past.   What if we walk away with a much richer 
understanding of the relationship of President and Supreme Court in the 
Civil War and nothing else?  This is enough for almost any other era, but 
it seems on the great constitutional questions of the Civil War, that we 
are largely unwilling to leave them indeterminate. 
This is not to say that legal actors in the Union and the Confederacy 
did not themselves reach legal and constitutional conclusions.  But we in 
the present remain open to arguments from all sides and remain rooted in 
6
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uncertainty and argumentation.  Was secession legal?  Was the 
confiscation of enemy property constitutional?  Was the blockade within 
presidential power?  All of these questions rested on the status of the 
Union and the Confederacy during the Civil War, which was contested 
during the Civil War and for decades afterwards.   
It is of course the case that there were winners and losers in the 
Civil War and that this colors the way we understand the legal questions 
we pose about the war.  It is not enough to say that these questions about 
the nature of the Civil War cannot be definitively answered.  Even as we 
reconstruct the arguments made on both sides on secession, we must 
recall at all times this was not a debating society but a contest over 
power during war.  If today we cannot make a definitive ruling on the 
ultimate legality of secession, it is folly to reconstruct the legal 
arguments made during the War without attention to who won and who 
lost the argument and why.  At points it is surely a case of might making 
right, or a legal argument settled at the point of a gun.  Whatever the 
legality of secession, it was surely settled as a practical matter at 
Appomattox.  But that is only the ending.   
It is the contingent and uncertain path to that point that is 
historically compelling.  If our task is to definitively determine the 
legality of secession, then once that is done we know who is right and 
who is wrong and how the Civil War ought to turn out.  If by contrast we 
do not ourselves settle the question, then we see this argument played 
out over years of warfare, and we see the relative power of these ideas 
inside northern and southern society.  It surely matters that the legality 
of secession was ultimately rejected, and this is in no small part a story 
of the relative power of competing ideologies inside societies at war.   
The Stampp piece, to my mind, has stood the test of time and 
remains essential reading, indeed remains the model for how the legal 
inquiry on secession ought to be pursued.  It remains the model not 
because he arrives at the right answer but instead for his embrace of 
historical uncertainty. 
Any of us who write on the Civil War are asked the questions 
Stampp raises, and others:  Was secession justified?  Who was right in 
the debate over habeas corpus, Taney or Lincoln?  Who was right and 
who was wrong across a number of great constitutional questions?  The 
answer I am calling for—“I do not know”—distances the past from the 
present in a way we almost cannot stand when it comes to the Civil War.  
It is here that the academic quality of academic writing, for good and for 
ill, might most contrast with the dominant narrative of the Civil War.  It 
is an open question for the field:  “is the history sufficient and can it 
7
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stand alone, with values embedded in the story we tell, and not the 
definitive legal answers we provide?” 
Yet this answer to the question of who was right on secession, I do 
not know, runs the risk of mischaracterizing the meaning of secession 
both at the time of the Civil War and today, and this brings me briefly to 
my second point.  It may be that secession may ultimately be most 
fundamentally not a close legal question, but rather a vessel for our 
questions about the meaning of slavery and emancipation.  This is a 
historical question:  “was secession essentially a referendum on 
slavery?”  This is the essential Stampp neglects in his constitutional 
inquiry.  If the answer is yes, then Stampp, in his emphasis on 
constitutional thought standing alone, both sheds light on secession and 
also omits the centrality of slavery in the secession crisis.   
Secession may be most important, then and now, as a symbol, a 
symbol of the legitimacy of the Confederacy and the fight to preserve 
slavery.  Interestingly, it may be that the symbolic meaning of secession 
was embraced by both sides, an embrace of secession as essentially 
driven by states’ rights, and an embrace of states’ rights that turned in 
both North and South, as Paul shows, largely on the question of the 
preservation and expansion of slavery.  It is here that Stampp’s legal 
focus leads us astray and presents us with an analytical frame we ought 
now to reject—namely treating secession as primarily a legal question.  
This does not mean that the legal argument is irrelevant or that it was 
infinitely malleable at the time.  This means only that a legal question 
turning on states’ rights and the right to secede was at all times 
embedded in the debate over slavery and cannot be considered first as a 
legal question and then as a political or social question.   
This is even more apparent when one examines the staying power 
of the symbolic meaning of secession.  The legitimacy of secession was 
at the heart of the Lost Cause and remains a potent symbol today for 
those seeking to deny the centrality of slavery to secession.  In this way, 
Stampp’s frame, in its presentation of a contained legal question, seems 
to me to miss a defining aspect of secession.  Stampp might well admit 
this of course, but to my mind, cannot make the claim that his only 
concern for purposes of this piece was the law and the Constitution.  
This is, I think, an untenable dichotomy and one that has largely, 
thankfully collapsed.  It is here that the presentist obsession with 
determining the ultimate legality of secession actually aids the history 
because it forces upon us the realization that our present concern for the 
place of slavery with secession was very much a concern of the Civil 
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War era.  It is a powerful reason why we still care so much about 
secession and why actors at the time did as well.   
We do not have to choose, indeed, between the abstract question of 
the legality of secession and its contrast with the lived experience of 
secession.  We can examine contemporaries’ competing assessments of 
legal and constitutional doctrine even as we take the realities of race and 
slavery into account. 
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